knowledge is a judgment bestowed on knowledge by those who are the intended consumers of that knowledge. Pragmatism accords the status of warranted knowledge only to the settled deliberations of a community of scholars (a discipline or a particular interpretive community). When a discipline speaks with clear consensus on a particular scientific matter, pragmatists insist that the rest of us regard these truth claims as constituting warranted assertions. On the contrary, when that disciplinary consensus begins to dissipate then the associated truth claims lose their warrantability and thus their legitimacy. In light of the growing dissent against consequentialist welfarism from within economics it would be difficult indeed to consider welfaristic truth claims as constituting warranted assertions. That dissent, now well documented, will not concern us here [Blackorby and Donaldson; Boadway 1974 Boadway , 1976 Boadway and Bruce; Bromley, 1989 Bromley, , 1990 Bromley, , 1997 Chipman and Moore; Coate; Cooter and Rappoport; Diamond and Hausman; Field, 1979 Field, , 1981 Gillroy; Gorman; Graaff; Lewin; Little; Mishan, 1969 Mishan, , 1980 Samuels; Samuelson; Tribe; Bromley, 1994, 1997] .
The more interesting question concerns the general failure of such welfare-based advice to be taken seriously by the political community into which it is projected as a truth rule for "rational" choice. This question is important because the historic and continuing disregard for welfaristic prescriptions is cause for applied economists to comment on the irrationality, the inscrutabilityindeed the venalityof the political process in democratic market economies. A richer theory of public policy would permit an honest assessment of the grounds for such criticism. In other words, what if the alleged "irrationality" of the policy process is simply an artifact of the disciplinary protocols used by applied economists to judge that process? Indeed, if the policy process in democratic market economies has its own internal logic and legitimacy then judgments about, and indictments of, that process from any group of disciplinary practitioners, including economists, lack justification.
The task, therefore, is to offer an accounta descriptionof how individuals and groups arrive at decisions. This account will provide an explanation of how individuals and groups work out what seems better, at the moment, to do. This account will consist of concepts, relations, and entailments that together will comprise a theory of choice and action. This theory is important for it allows us to determine if indeed there is a logic to a process that is regularly criticized by economists for its resistance to the optimality prescriptions from welfare economics. Spelling out a theory of action in this way will allow us to assess if there are indeed logical flaws in the decision process that somehow lead to "wrong" decisions in the absence of welfaristic advice from economists. Of course welfare economists might be expected to regard the process as flawed precisely because it has routinely ignored welfaristic truth claims from economists. This criticism cannot be taken seriously, for obvious reasons. The task is, therefore, to offer a plausible description of how public policy actually proceeds in most democratic market economies.
If this description is regarded as reasonably accurate by those individuals involved in the domain of collective choice then I will have offered a theory of public policy. Notice that this will not be a normative theory about how collective choice ought to proceed. It will be descriptive in that it will provide concepts and relations that help us to get a grip on how the process of choice actually unfolds.
Before going further I must devote a few moments to the idea of a theory. This is necessary because in economics we have a very restrictive idea about what constitutes a theory. Indeed, when talking of "theory" it is common for economists immediately to launch into a discussion of their modelsthe majority of which are some variant of a constrained maximization problem. A model is not a theory. A model is a structurally dependent analytical engine whose purpose resides entirely on its internal validity.
Models may or may not fit the world they presume to reflect. A theory, on the other hand, is a constellation of concepts and relations offering a plausible structure for thinking about and comprehending particular connections of interest. If one has a theory of the French Revolution it means that one can advance specific concepts, connections, and logical entailments that offer a plausible explanation of that event.
What does a theory do for us? A theory allows plausible explanations of past and current events, and it allows plausible predictions of futureand indeed of pastevents.
How do we know we have a good theory? It is a good theory if it can withstand internal (disciplinary) challenges to its concepts, to its relational properties, and to its entailments (explanations). A good theory also withstands internal challenges to its predictions. The philosopher William Whewell insisted that a theory, upon formulation, must pass a variety of deductive tests before it can be considered a plausible empirical engine of knowledge. These tests concern: (1) prediction; (2) consilience; and (3) coherence [Whewell, 1858] .
With respect to prediction, a theory's hypotheses must be able to foretell events that have yet to occur. Or, the hypotheses must be able to predict as-yet unknown events that have happened in the past. In this latter case, predictions are tested when we are induced to take a more careful look at the past to see if the predicted event did in fact occur. Consilience implies that a theory's hypotheses must be able to explain and determine cases of a kind different from those imagined in the formation of the hypotheses. Coherence implies that the hypotheses of a theory must become more coherent over time. To Whewell, coherence occurs when we can extend our hypotheses to colligate (unite) a new class of phenomena without ad hoc modification of those hypotheses. Colligation brings together a number of empirical facts by "superinducing" upon them a conception that unites the facts and renders them expressible by a more general law.
So when I say that I am attempting to work out a theory of environmental policy it means that I seek an account that will allow me to offer an explanation of why and how decisions emerge from that process. If I am successful, we may gain an understanding (verstehen) of the policy process. The theory should also allow predictions of particular aspects of past or future policies (not the specific policies themselves). The theory should permit inferences about other kinds of policy initiatives, and the salience of these inferences should increase with time.
II. What is Public Policy?
I start with the idea that public policy is properly understood as collective action in liberation, restraint, and expansion of individual action. Notice that "collective action" in economics is ordinarily concerned with individuals coming together voluntarily to accomplish that which they are unable to accomplish through individualistic behavior in markets. Indeed some economists regard collective action as a sign of some market failure. By way of contrast, the concept of collective action employed here is taken from John R. Commons who regarded collective action as that which occurs in the legislature, the executive, and the courts. The decisions of these governmental entities are collective because these entities speak for and to the the political community in their legislation, in their administrative rulings, and in their judicial decrees. All members of a nation state are implicated in these decisions, and in that sense we are each liberated, constrained, and reconstituted by the actions of the collective authority of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.
I have previously discussed the significance of the internal acceptance of a theory and its predictions and explanations. Internal acceptance implies that a particular disciplinean interpretive communityhas reached a working consensus about concepts, relations, and their implications. This agreement is internal to the discipline and as such this agreement can be said to represent, at this time, the settled deliberations of that particular interpretive community with respect to the specific theoretical issue under consideration. Members of the discipline speak with one voice about particular matters under consideration. We might even suggest that their agreement represents specific truth claims emanating from the discipline. For the rest of us, we would be well advised to take a discipline's truth claims seriously. If cosmologists offer a theorya truth claimabout the behavior of the planets it is probably prudent for us to accept this account until a better one (a new truth claim) comes along. But this is not a universal requirement.
In particular, some revealed truth claims might be received quite differently. If musicologists tell us that the music theory and structure of a particular composer's work is the paragon of perfection, we are under no obligation to like that music. If lawyers reveal to us the legalistic erudition and sparkling wisdom of particular judicial decisions, we are under to compulsion to consider the decisions as correct, fair, or pertinent. If the received wisdom in psychology is that adults who sexually abuse children are not dangerous under particular circumstances, some parents may be excused for feeling anxiety if one or more such people are seen roaming the streets. And if the world association of plant geneticists issues a proclamation declaring that genetically modified tomatoes are, to the best of their knowledge, really quite safe many people will not be easily persuaded by this news. The point here is that if the cosmologists get it wrong in their theory of planetary motion few of us will notice or care. But if psychologists, or lawyers, or musicologists or geneticists get it wrong many of us will be affected in ways that we might find unacceptable. And so we see that internal agreement of a community of disciplinary adherentseagerly engaged in what Thomas Kuhn would call "normal science"is not sufficient reason for the rest of us to stop what we are doing and instantly reformulate our thinking. After all, the citizenry has seen disciplinary truth claims revised with some regularity in the pastespecially is this so in matters of diet, nutrition, exercise, investment strategies, and the safety of nuclear tests during the latter phases of World War II.
The point here is that the warranted consensus of a community of disciplinary adherents is a necessary but hardly sufficient condition for the immediate acquiescence of the rest of us. Indeed, our acquiescence in their truth claims must rest on a separate set of arguments and reasons from those to which the discipline alone is privileged. Lacking this, disciplinary practitioners are not entitled to expect the rest of us to accept their particular truth claims on faitha word of considerable disgust to the committed Cartesians who now dominate the academy. The pertinence of this point for economists is obvious. The received wisdom of consequentialist welfarism is precisely concerned with telling the citizens of a political community which actions will enhance aggregate welfare, and therefore which actions are "socially preferred." Why are economists surprised and dismayed when the citizenry merely smiles at such conceit?
The theory to be developed here draws inspiration from the pragmatic philosophers. The leading pragmatists include Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Hans Joas, and Richard Rorty. Pragmatism offers both a theory of action and a theory of truth. I will discuss each in turn.
III. Pragmatism as a Theory of Action
The pragmatic theory of action is grounded in abductiona method of inference that Aristotle called diagnosis. Abduction brings together particular observed phenomena (results) with particular axioms (rules) to suggest hypotheses and assumptions (cases) that seem to offer plausible reasons for the observed results. Abduction offers promise as an epistemology because it is the only form of inference that introduces novel hypotheses into the search for reasons for particular events. When we can identify reasons for events we have a plausible basis for making predictions about those events, and for advancing explanations of those events. In contrast to abduction, deduction is an epistemology devoted to defense of the core axioms of a discipline, and when economists use those axioms as the "scientific" basis for policy prescriptions that are claimed to be welfare enhancing or "socially preferred," deduction becomes the basis of normative prescriptions about what is best to do.
Abduction as a way of knowing is not limited to scientists in need of hypotheses about cause and effect. Rather, abduction is an inferential program familiar to each of us.
As sentient beings, we are continually observing particular settings and circumstances (apprehended "facts") about the world around us. Coincident with this apprehension is a process of navigating our situatedness in those apprehended impressions of the world around us. Notice that this navigation is fundamentally a diagnostic (abductive) activity and the observations and interpretations we form about that activity comprise the knowledge base for the formulation of abductive inferences about those settings and circumstancesand our relation to them. Indeed, our observational and interpretive interest in those settings and circumstances is driven by the realization that the essence of living is incessant doing. At every turn we are presented with new "impressions"each of which stimulates, indeed demands, assessment, interpretation, and response. We are surprised.
The Cartesian program is one of radical doubt about these impressions unless they can be empirically confirmed by independent testing. On this account, to have knowledge is to have accurate and indisputable mappings aboutand descriptions ofthe world "out there." To committed Cartesians there can be but one "true" description and interpretation of the "facts" in the world and it is the business of science to produce that immutable description and interpretation. Scientific truth consists in getting that description and interpretation "right." Once this right mapping is obtained, it is possible to offer up universal truths about the world around us. In the ultimate triumph, science might produce immutable truths capable of trumping indigenous knowledge, traditional wisdom, religious dogma, and superstition. Scientific knowledge can trump all other pretenders to truth. Cartesians believe that if science is done right the human mind becomes a flawless mirror of nature. This is the promise of modernism.
A. Pragmatism and Individual Action
Pragmatists deny the notion of the human mind as a mirror of nature. Instead, pragmatists insist that our apprehensions of the settings and circumstances within which we are situated are necessarily limited to impressions of the world around us. And most importantly, different persons necessarily hold different impressions. There are, to be sure, objects and events "out there" in the world, but there are no universal and objectively "true" descriptions of the objects and events in that worldthere are simply impressions. To put the matter another way, claims about "truth" about the world around us is a property of statements about that world. Truth is not a property of objects and eventsthe "thing in itself." Rather, truth is a property of statements about objects and events. Individuals do not discuss (and argue about) objects and eventsthey discuss and argue about statements about, and descriptions of, objects and events.
Each of us apprehends settings and circumstances within which we are situated, but especially as we move through new settings and circumstances. These apprehended phenomena become our impressions of those settings and circumstances. Such impressions are just that-acquired sensory signals (signs) as we contemplate our situatedness in the constellation of settings and circumstances that constitute, in the words of Jürgen Habermas, our "lifeworld." These impressions are the raw material of our understanding of our lifeworld, but they are of little value until they have been transformed into coherent stories that we can express to ourselvesand to others. When we describe these impressions to ourselves (or to others) these descriptions constitute expressions about the world around us. In other words, individuals create expressions of their lifeworld. These expressions are the stories we tell to ourselves and to others. More importantly, these expressions form the mental stage on which we live. This stage constitutes our individually perceived and individually constructed "reality."
We spend our waking hours apprehending impressions and formulating expressions of those apprehended signs. I earlier suggested that the essence of living is incessant doing. The instigator of our impressions is surprise. Surprise is the necessary condition for us to take notice of the world around us and to process received impressions. After all, if one fails to notice particular settings and circumstances then this disregard implies familiarity and hence the observation is both fleeting and of little moment. Notice that settings and circumstances are either ignored (itself an action that dismisses the impressions without further action) or they are processed as novel impressions. Those novel impressions become new expressions. Why is that car turning toward me? What does that house look like on the inside? I have never noticed those weeds beforewhy are they so profuse? Why is my roof leaking? We see that surprise triggers mental processes that confront settled habits of mind and induce us to form abductive syllogisms. Individual thought and action is abductively informed and animated.
As we form abductive syllogisms about our apprehended lifeworld we are at the same time reckoning our situatedness in the panoply of those impressions. From the conjunction of these impressions and inferences about the world being experienced and our "place" in that worldand from the meanings we then attribute to these impressions, inferences, and situatednesswe abductively construct plausible inferences about the "need" to act, and about the "best" actions to take in the light of the abductive knowledge just formulated. It is here that I make use of G. L. S. Shackle's concept of created imaginings [Shackle, 1961] . Expressions are stories we tell ourselves about our present lifeworld. Imaginings are stories we tell ourselves about possible future lifeworlds.
The essential function of expressions is to constitute (to construct) the mental stage onto which we project our imaginings of future outcomes to see how they will "play out"plausibly materialize. The central idea here is not just the positing of created imaginings in the abstract. It is, rather, our created imaginings projected onto the stage of our emergent expressions. It is here that we formulate the reasons to select from among the array of plausible created imaginings. Individual choice (action) is, therefore, a contest between expressions and imaginings. We are necessarily situated in an apprehended reality (an expression), and we continually reflect on alternative created imaginings. This deliberation consists in checking them against our expressions of the present and of the future. Pragmatists insist that we act when we find a created imagining that satisfies expectations about situated outcomes in the future. And of course we also act when we reject all created imaginings and decide to stick with our current action trajectory. To do nothing is to do something.
B. Pragmatism and Joint Action
With this account of individual action in hand, we may now focus on the problem of action involving more than one individual. The challenge should be obvious. The foremost encumbrance in joint action is found in the necessity to deal with contending expressions. It is in the nature of being individuals that we necessarily formulate and hold individualized expressions of our world. Of course most of us will agree that lamps are lamps, but the more pertinent issues go beyond this superficial identification of what the object appears to be. Is that lamp an antique? Does that lamp give enough light for reading? Why does that lamp tilt? Did that lamp cost as much as it would appear? How can he afford such a fine lamp? Is that lampshade dirty or is that its "real" color? Why would he have such an outrageous lamp in an otherwise tasteful room?
Notice the constituents of expressions in this string of questionsantique, light, tilt, income, cost, ambiguous lampshade, outrageous, and tasteful. We see that a lamp is not merely a lamp. Instead, a lamp is a series of effects constituting expressions to differentially situated observers. As Charles Sanders Peirce insisted, the meaning of an object to us is nothing but the sum of its effects [Peirce, 1934] . We form our expressions by collecting, sorting, and re-describing to ourselves the sum of our impressions of the effects of the subjects of our apprehended senses. And of course different individuals will ask themselves quite different questions about that lamp. It is in this sense that the lamp will comprise quite different expressions to different people. Is a lamp just a lamp?
The obvious difficulty in joint action is that everyone else is doing the same thing, although to quite different effect. It follows that each of us will apprehend slightly different lifeworlds and thus each of us will have quite distinct expressions about the world "as it is" and about our situatedness in that world. It could not be otherwise since we are, by definition, different sentient beings. In the context of joint action this means that there is not a single stage (expression) upon which our quite independent and disparate created imaginings are projected. Instead, that there are as many "stages" as there are participants in the community whose task it is to ascertain but a single course of action for the future. Which brings us to the equally plentiful multitude of created imaginings being projected onto the multiple stages by those holding quite distinct expressions. And we wonder why collective action is contentious? Collective action forces all participants to agree on the many aspects of the lamp.
We see that the central challenge in collective action is for the decision group to work out a reconciliation of the multitude of expressions and imaginings about the future.
Notice that the issue here is not one of discovering the "right" expression out of the multitude of contending expressions. Nor is the issue to discover the "right" created imagining to fit the "right" expression. Indeed the notion of "rightness" is precisely the wrong description of the process followed by those faced with the necessity of collective choice.
The task, instead, is to focus on the various reasons for the disparate expressions, and for the disparate imaginings. Pragmatists insist that progress in such difficult matters is to be found in reasoned debate. We tend to put the matter as the asking for and giving of reasons [Brandom 1994 [Brandom , 2000 . Those who come to the choice problem with their mind made up invoke absolutes where reasons are in order. And the only thing to be said for such absolutes is that they give us a moral holiday from having to think hard about the To quote Hans Joas:
In pragmatism, precisely because it considers all psychical operations in the light of their functionality for action, it becomes impossible to hold the position that the setting of an end is an act of consciousness per se that occurs outside of contexts of action. Rather, the setting of an end can only be the result of reflection on resistances met by conduct that is oriented in a number of different ways. Should it prove impossible to follow simultaneously all the various guiding impulses or compulsions to action, a selection of a dominant motive can take place which then, as an end, dominates the other motives or allows them to become effective only in a subordinate manner…action is teleological only in a diffuse fashion. Even our perception is shaped by our capacities and the possibilities for action [Joas 1993, p. 21] .
We see here recognition of the many images of action, and we see that the setting of ends outside of the context of action is psychologically impossible. That is, the prior specification of created imaginings is impossible until those who must act are in a position (a context) to act. And for collective action, being in the context of action means being surrounded by others with divergent expressions, yet resolutely on the way to formulating their own unique and divergent created imaginings. Why would we assume that individuals should have identical expressions of the world in which they find themselves? Joint action is contentious, ab initio, because of the reality of contending expressions. Because joint action must ultimately result in but a single choice (coordinated and coincident action), contending expressions are inevitably confronted by contending created imaginings. Small wonder that collective actionpublic policyis so contentious. The participants in that process bring differing expressions about the status quo ante, and quite different created imaginings about the prospects for the future.
Rather than dwell on the processes whereby a workable synthesis emerges from this expressional cacophony, we must instead recognize that such a synthesis does indeed emergewithout that synthesis there could be no collective action. So the interesting problem here is not to question the existence of this or any emergent synthesisthe decision reached. The problem is how we might look upon that synthesis and how we might describe it. And this brings us to the benediction applied to that decisionto that synthesis. This synthesis, the emergent decision, has but one pertinent propertyits acceptance by those charged with formulating a course forward.
2 What, precisely is signified by that acceptance? Would we say that the processand the many participantsgenerated a decision that no one wanted? This is doubtful. The more likely description is that the decision represented the "consensus" of the body making the decision. And what exactly is meant here by consensus? The pragmatist would suggest that this word is simply another way of saying that the decision seemed, to all (most?) participants, to be the best thing to do under the circumstances. Is this but another way of saying that this particular act seemed, at the moment, the right thing to do? If this action is the "best" and it is "right" then what is left for us to say about it? The pragmatist would suggest, without irony, that we might as well bestow the ultimate benediction on the decision. On the way to doing that, the pragmatist might well regard the decision as evidence of the emergence of settled beliefs about what ought to be done. Recall that truth is not a property of objects and events in our lifeworld. Truth is, instead, a property of propositions and claims about the objects and events in that lifeworld. We have, in other words, the emergence of a collective commitment to a way forward, the truth content of which is no longer in dispute.
Can we call this decision "the truth" concerning the best way forward? We can certainly refer to it as a truth claim. That is, this decision and the action it entails is a good thing to do. Because truth is a property of propositions and statements, the claim that this act is (or seems to be) the best thing to do under the present circumstances constitutes a statement about something. It is a proposition with truthful content.
Pragmatists insist that truth is the compliment we pay to our settled deliberations.
IV. Pragmatism as a Theory of Truth …one may say that truth is a matter of collective judgment and that it is stabilized by the collective actions which use it as a standard for judging other claims.
Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth, p. 6
The foregoing discussion offered one way of describing individual and joint working out the best means but also the best ends. Notice that this account is seriously at odds with the decision process as envisaged by most economists. In that standard economic approach, individuals (and groups) start with a clear end (goal) in mind, they gather evidence of the costs and efficacy of alternative means for reaching that end, and they then select the most advantageous means for achieving that predetermined end. The "best" means is the one in which the net economic value (benefits of the end minus costs of the means) is as large as possible. Notice the clear distinction between ends and means, and notice also that ends and means do not change in the course of calculating the "best" means to reach the pre-determined end. On this account of the choice process, economics is strictly instrumental to optimal choices over ends that remain unexamined and beyond the ambit of economic analysis. Lionel Robbins would insist, after all, that economics is the science of allocating scarce resources among competing and limitless endsthe assessment of which is not an economic matter.
It may be noticed that this process not at all about choiceit is about calculation.
In assessing this realm of economics, G. L. S. Shackle was moved to comment:
Conventional economics is not about choice, but about acting according to necessity. Economic man obeys the dictates of reason, follows the logic of choice. To call this conduct choice is surely a misuse of words, when we suppose that to him the ends amongst which he can select, and the criteria of selection, are given, and the means to each end are known….Choice in such a theory is empty, and conventional economics should abandon the word. Is the only alternative to a theory of necessary action a theory of non-rational, of arbitrary action? The escape we have suggested consists not in abandonment of rationality, not in abandonment of the adoption of the means which will lead to the selected end, but in abandonment of the postulate that the available ends are given. The escape from necessity…lies in the creation of ends, and this is possible because ends, so long as they remain available and liable to rejection or adoption, must inevitably be experiences by imagination or anticipation and not by external occurrence. Choice, inescapably, is choice amongst thoughts, and thoughts….are not given [Shackle, 1961, pp. 272-73] ."
In short, choice is choice amongst thoughts, and thoughts are not given but created from impressions and imaginings. Shackle's theory of choice, articulated in his Decision, Order, and Time, is consistent with the pragmatic theory of action spelled out in the previous section. What remains for us here is to extend that theory to address the matter of whether or not "correct" and "rational" decisions can be said to emerge. In other words, the problem now becomes one of judging the decisions reached-such judgment being essential before we will know if welfaristic truth claims can be (or ought to be) relied upon to rectify the allegedly flawed decisions that would otherwise emanate from individuals and groups. Applied economists committed to consequentialist welfarism are certain that their favored decision protocol is necessary to rescue individual and collective action from incoherence and irrational choice. But, as above, a large number of economists dispute this claim. We see that welfarism fails the necessary condition for coherenceit lacks general acceptance within the discipline from which it emerges. In other words, its concepts, its relations, and its entailments are deemed incoherent by a significant portion of economists who have explored that particular body of economic theory.
The second issue to be discussed concerns whether or not consequentialist welfarism, despite its lack of disciplinary coherence, is "close enough" that despite some of its conceptual flaws it might offer essential guidance to generate more "rational" decisions for individuals and for collective action by groups. Does consequentialist welfarism promise help in the nature of "second-best" decision protocols? To assess this question we must explore the decision problem from a slightly different angle.
The standard economic approach is to identify the correct decision protocols for reaching the correct decision. The logic here is that if the right decision protocols are followed the resulting decision will, by definition, be correct. 3 That is, correct decision protocols are the cause of correct choices (decisions), and correct decisions are the effect of employing correct decision protocols. Pragmatists would insist that applied economists have cause and effect confused. Rather, pragmatists insist that the identification of the correct decision is something that occurs after a consensus has been reached regarding what seems best to do. Here the cause of the correct decision is not some external truth rule (a "correct" decision protocol) but rather the incessant working out ofthe diligent searching forwhat seems the better thing to do in the current setting and circumstances. Once that has been worked out, the emergent choice becomes the correct choice by virtue of having been worked out. After all, would it not be surprising to discover that an individual (or a group) decided to do something that had been identified as clearly not the best thing to do at the time?
Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, insisted that:
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real [1934, p. 405] .
The arrival at a consensus about what is better to do is always predicated upon a clear but evolving notion of the purposes of the futurean outcome in the future for the sake of which action must be taken today. Philosophers call this final cause [Russell, 1945] . Purpose is the core of pragmatism, and settled beliefs about both purpose and how to get there represent the essence of "correct" thoughts and beliefs about the appropriate action to be taken. Richard Rorty insists that the right question to ask is: "For what purposes would it be useful to hold that belief? [Rorty, 1999, p. xxiv] ." He sees this question as rather akin to asking: for what purposes would it be useful to load that particular program onto my computer? Pragmatists insist that science and religion are each perfectly legitimate activities for acquiring and categorizing knowledgethough of course for quite different purposes. We see, at once, that the durable struggle, indeed hostility, between science and religion is a product of the frequently obstinate view from both sides that each alone possesses THE TRUTH. If it could be understood that truth is that which, at the moment, seems most useful to believe, then religious beliefs and scientific beliefs could quite easily co-exist without a fight. For the rest of us the issue is straightforward: do not expect clerics to provide relief from hemorrhoids and heartburn, and do not ask scientists to preside at weddings and funerals.
In the realm of public policy, when economists offer specific prescriptions about collective choiceindicating which decisions are efficient, correct, rational, best, and socially preferredwe see truth claims from a particular discipline projected onto the individual and collective stage of contending expressions and contending created imaginings about what is best for the future of those persons (and their descendents) responsible for these contested expressions and contested created imaginings. The pragmatist would challenge these truth claims by asking the following question: can those specific truth claims be justified to all members of that particular community? If that justification is possible then the truth claims are valuable. They are valuable because the community into which they are imposed finds them helpful, useful, edifying, and instrumental to improving the working out of what seems best to do in the current setting and circumstances. If those truth claims cannot be justified to the members of the community then such claims are counterfeit. They are counterfeit only because the community finds them to be impertinent to the task they currently face.
As above, the issue here is not truth but justified claims. The pragmatist would ask whether economistic truth claims are capable of being justified to an audience of individuals who are the objects of our interest in improving their lot with our "socially preferred" or "optimal" policies. The pragmatist would want to discuss the sovereign nature of truth claims emanating from applied economics. By sovereign I mean here the ruling nature of economic truth rules. Specifically, the pragmatist would ask the following question: "why, exactly, are the truth claims of economics more pertinent to this particular choice setting than, say, the truth claims of psychology?" And the pragmatist would be quick to rule out of bounds the automatic reply from the economist that economics is "the science of choice." Such tendentious claims raise their own pragmatic challenge. Specifically, is it a true statement that "economics is the science of choice"? Could this particular claim be sustained before an audience of psychologists, sociologists, and psychiatrists? I do not think so. On the other hand, a slight modification would enhance the odds of the true: "economics is one of the sciences of human decision making, along with philosophy, psychiatry, and psychologyand perhaps astrology." It is likely that this latter proposition could be justified to a large pertinent linguistic community.
Economists need not feel singled out for special disregard here. After all, there are a variety of disciplines and specialized practices that also have structured prescriptions about what is the best thing to do in that particular choice situation. We might imagine hydraulic engineers, biologists, planners, lawyers, and water chemists each offering particular disciplinary prescriptions about what is best to do in matters of water pollution. But because economists have come to regard the discipline as the science of choice, having our truth claims ignored by decision makers strikes deep into our collective confidence, and often leads to charges of inscrutability on the part of policy makers. Of course there are economic issues at stake in pollution policyjust as there are in all policy matters. But the presence of economic implications does not, by that fact alone, authorize economics to become the dominant realm of reason.
We have here a debate about the true and the quest to justify claims about the true. I have earlier pointed out that pragmatism insists that the word true does not apply to events and objects in the world around us. Rather, the word true applies to statements about events and objects in that world. In other words, truth is not a property of perfect correspondence between propositions (words) and particular events and objects to which those propositions (words) referbetween language and things. Truth is not denotative.
Truth is, instead, a property of particular statements (words) about specific events and objectsbetween contending linguistic claims. Truth is connotative.
With this in hand we can reconsider the truth claims of economics with respect to statements about policies that are optimal, rational, efficient or socially preferred. The pragmatist would ask whether those terms are properly denotative of present or future states in the "real" world? That is, can one stipulate that there is a clear and valid connection between specific descriptive words such as "optimal" and specific events (new institutions) that might be enacted? My earlier arguments insist that there is no such correspondence. Such terms of art cannot possibly describe actual outcomes in the "real" world. Instead, these terms (optimal, efficient, rational, socially preferred) refer to properties of the analytical engines (deductive models) constructed by applied economists to divine the optimal (or the efficient or the socially preferred) policy. Such truth claims are entirely reflexivethey are self-referential.
V. The Emerging Theory
Human choice is properly characterized as prospective volitionthe human will in action, looking to the future, trying to determine how that future ought to unfold. As (1) feasible; and (2) the best thing to do at this particular time. This process can be thought of as an exercise in pleading, resistance, persuasion, cautious acquiescence, and eventual emergence of a consensus.
The two properties of that consensusfeasible and best at this timerepresent judgments reached by those individuals who are responsible for collective action. Notice that this judgment is something that can only emerge as individuals and groups contend with the need to reconcile disparate expressions and imaginings. The first step in this process of working out an emergent consensus is necessarily confined to legislators, administrators, and judges. In a democracy, the second step is to justify this agreement to the political community whose individual actions will be liberated, restrained, and expanded. In the absence of this justification collective action will lack legitimacy. This justification to the larger political community necessarily entails the giving of reasons for the decision reached. The process of giving reasons must be carefully crafted so that the reasons given match as closely as possible the asking for reasons that is expected from the political community to whom the collective action is directed. 4 This activity is properly thought of justification in the service of emergent consent.
This theory of choice (and action) stands in contrast to the deterministic and linear model that characterizes standard rational choice theory. Given the criticism of rational choice theory [Bowles; Field; Rabin] , and the failure of coherence in consequentialist welfarism, it cannot be said that there are settled beliefs in economics about individual and collective choice. Pragmatists insist that disciplinary beliefs that fail to satisfy minimal coherence standards from within that particular interpretive community cannot be the source of credible or compelling truth claims emanating from that discipline and directed at the larger community. Pragmatists further insist that, even if the proffered truth claims are deemed coherent by the discipline from which they spring, the projection of those truth claims into social choice situations is illegitimate unless there is widespread acceptance on the part of those to whom the truth claims are directed. Individuals in contemporary life retain the authority to rejectfor their own reasonsthe truth claims from any source. The status of valuable knowledge is a property bestowed upon truth claims by those to whom such knowledge is directed. Valuable knowledge is not a property that can be claimed for disciplinary truths by those who produce that knowledge.
All that the producers of truth claims can justifiably assert is that these claims share wide agreement within the interpretive community out of which they arise.
Economics applied to public policy fails the pragmatist's conditions on both counts. Welfare economics fails the test of coherence within economics, and economists' truth claims about "optimal", or "socially preferred" policies are routinely ignored by those decision makers to whom they are directed. This does not mean that economic concepts and relations cannot provide valuable information to the process of working out what seems best to do at this particular time about specific problematic situations. But it does mean that economics must remain silent concerning what is best to do on the authority of economics alone. And it means that economists must abandon their practice of criticizing decisions for being irrational, inefficient, non-optimal, or socially inferior to other more "welfare enhancing" policies.
Pragmatism insists that public policy in generaland environmental policy in particularcannot legitimately be held hostage to the truth claims imposed on it by economists (or those from any other discipline). Volitional pragmatism employs abduction to uncover the reasons for particular policy choices. When we find reasons for choices we will be on our way to the development of a theory of environmental policy.
That theory will require explicit recognition of the concepts of impressions, expressions, and created imaginings. That theory will require recognition that joint action in the policy arena entails the working out of contending expressions and created imaginings. It will require recognition that human agents cannot possibly articulate coherent and salient wants in isolation from the specific context of choice in which they learn about those wants as they learn about what they can have. Outside of this context, expressions of wants are mere "cheap talk."
Environmental policylike all public policyseeks to modify individual domains of choice by restraining, liberating, and expanding the capacities of each of us to engage in particular activities. Policy is not some alien "intervention" into the otherwise wondrous "free market" of such appeal to some writers. Indeed what some are pleased to call "the market" is simply the constructed artifact of prior collective action. Policy is nothing but a word we apply to a continual process of redefiningreconstructingnew realms of individual and group action. Public policy has been unnecessarily mystified by virtue of its having been embedded in the fictional logic of rational choice. If we could but see policy as a word that describes the incessant human quest for contending with surprise in the human condition, we would see that policy is not at all mysterious. Policy is simply choice and action in which groups of individuals work out what seems better, at the moment, to do. We do not need, nor do we want, economists telling us which of those plausible futures are socially preferred. We will figure that out for ourselves as we go about figuring out how to reconcile our contending expressions and imaginings. 
